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IS FRIENDSHIP A PROPER TOPIC FOR ETHICS? 
BY ALAN WATT 
HE STARTING POINT of this paper is an observation about the very 
differing degrees of attention that have been paid to the topic of 
friendship by the great figures of the Western tradition. While Plato 
devoted an entire dialogue to it and Aristotle thought it worth two full 
chapters of his Nicomachean Ethics, modern philosophers have usually 
treated it as a minor footnote or ignored it altogether.1 Apparently, then, 
friendship no longer counts. But why not? And is the modern tendency to 
avoid discussion of friendship justifiable or regrettable? These are the 
questions I will seek to answer in this paper. 
My initial guiding assumption is that the disappearance of friendship 
from ethics is not simply a matter of changing taste or fashion. I assume 
there must be deeper reasons, which will have something to do with a 
changing understanding of what the discourse of ethics can hope to achieve. 
Or, to put it another way, I assume that in asking the question “is friendship 
a proper topic for ethics?” I am committing myself to answering the question 
“how has ethics changed, such that in one epoch friendship can appear to be 
a central element of it, while in another it can seem marginal or irrelevant?” 
Furthermore, in asking whether friendship should be reinstated I am asking 
primarily whether ethics should change (again) in order to (re-)accommodate 
it, and if so how. The paper is thus considerably more about ethics (specifically, 
meta-ethics) than it is about friendship, for the question of what friendship 
is has little bearing on the question of whether it is a topic for ethics. 
Friendship as a concept I consider only as an element of the broader ethical 
position of modern thinkers who would re-instate it, as then it is of interest 
to see how it would fit with their revisionist view of the nature of ethics. 
The questions I treat in this paper are large ones, and considerable 
restrictions both of scope and depth of analysis are required in order to make 
it manageable in the space available to me here. I will proceed as follows. 
First, I very briefly contrast ancient and modern conceptions of what ethics 
is to show how friendship is a natural part of the former and is naturally 
excluded from the latter. Next, I try to put up a basic case for this historical 
                                         
1 As Lorraine Pangle notes in her comprehensive study of the treatment of 
friendship in the history of Western philosophy, “in the four centuries since 
Bacon and Montaigne wrote,…friendship has virtually disappeared as a theme 
of philosophical discourse.” Lorraine Pangle, Aristotle and the Philosophy of 
Friendship (Cambridge: CUP, 2003), p. 3. 
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transformation of ethics, which contains both normative and metaphysical 
elements. Then, finally, I briefly consider two modern thinkers, both of 
whom discuss friendship and have deep critiques of the modern ethical frame-
work: MacIntyre and Nietzsche. Though others could also be discussed, there 
is a clear logic to considering this pair. In the Anglo-Saxon world, MacIntyre 
has been at the forefront of efforts to question the grounding questions of 
ethics and propose alternative frameworks for debate. And he himself suggests 
that if there is to be any “third way” apart from the “liberal modernity”2 he 
opposes and the resurrected Aristotelianism he proposes, it will be provided 
by Nietzsche.3 Up to this point I largely go along with MacIntyre, but I 
diverge from him radically when it comes to judgement of the relative merits 
of his and Nietzsche’s approaches. I am much more sceptical than MacIntyre 
about the prospects of neo-Aristotelianism overcoming the objections of 
“liberal modernity”, while conversely I think the Nietzschean alternative 
offers a way of breaking out of the dilemma that we would otherwise be left 
in, and therefore of helping us find a way back to friendship in ethics. 
1. WHY FRIENDSHIP DISAPPEARED FROM ETHICS. 
In this first part of the paper I want to present, as neutrally as I can, the 
reasons why friendship seemed a central topic in ethics to Aristotle but is 
perceived as a marginal one by most modern ethical theorists. At this stage I 
am merely interested in making explicit the different conceptions of ethics 
that lead to this divergence, not in judging which conception, if any, is 
superior (that discussion is reserved for the later sections of the paper). 
When Aristotle first introduces the topic of friendship he justifies the 
move on the grounds that “it is a kind of virtue, or implies virtue, and it is 
also most necessary for living.”4 I will not consider at this stage whether 
Aristotle is correct about either of these assertions; my interest is rather in 
the criteria for inclusion, namely that friendship is a virtue and/or is 
necessary for living. This has to be compared with Aristotle’s opening remarks 
on the general nature of ethics, which he considers to be an inquiry into the 
nature of the good life; and with his general formula for what the good life is, 
                                         
2 MacIntyre has a number of ways of referring to the modern period in ethics, but I 
will generally use this one, both because it is a convenient way of denoting the 
intimate connection MacIntyre sees between modernity and liberalism, and 
also because when it comes to discussion of MacIntyre’s position the contrasts 
I will draw will in the first instance be with liberal theorists.  
3 Alisdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 1981), pp. 111-2. 
4 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. J. A. K. Thomson and H. Tredennick 
(London: Penguin, 1976), 1155a4. 
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namely “an activity of soul in accordance with virtue.”5 Thus to name 
friendship as a virtue and necessary for (the good) life is in Aristotle’s terms 
already to designate it a topic for ethical discussion, since the bulk of 
Aristotle’s ethics is simply a delineation of the various virtues. Having friends 
is part of a virtuous life, so we need to consider what friendship truly means 
to ensure that we have the right type of friendship, friendship that conduces 
to good life. 
Why then has modernity generally seen no need to treat friendship as part 
of ethics? It could be, of course, that modernity does not share Aristotle’s 
judgement that friendship is a virtue or a necessary element of a good life. 
Certainly, as we shall see shortly, one of the general reasons for liberal 
modernity’s rejection of Aristotle is that it considers him too ready to make 
substantive ethical judgements about the nature of the good life, which a liberal 
ethos prefers to leave to the individual. Moreover apart from the general 
point of liberal principle that each person should be allowed to decide his 
good for himself, I suspect that the influence of the Christian ideals of the 
monk and the hermit, cut off from the world and devoted to God, has created 
considerable scepticism towards Aristotle’s claim that friendship is 
“necessary” for the good life.6 Aristotle’s judgement about the necessity of 
friendship for the good life is thus liable to seem somewhat rash to moderns. 
But this is not the main reason why friendship is no longer discussed by 
ethicists. The key change is not in our judgement about the value of friend-
ship for the good life, but in the general preoccupations of ethics: for ethics 
today is, by and large, no longer about the good life or about the virtues. 
Instead, modern ethics focusses almost exclusively on the nature and grounds 
of moral obligation (e.g. whether I am morally obliged to tell the truth in all 
circumstances and why/why not). Given this central preoccupation, the 
disappearance of friendship as a topic is perfectly understandable. For whereas 
it makes perfect sense to discuss whether friendship is a key element of a 
good life, it is clearly absurd to suggest that friendship is morally obligatory. 
Moral obligation concerns actions that we are always required to do or 
refrain from doing in a given set of circumstances, whereas friendship is by 
its very nature a selective affair – as Aristotle says, we cannot be intimate 
with a large number of people.7 
                                         
5 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1098a18. 
6 On this point Pangle suggests that “Christianity’s call to devote one’s heart as 
completely as possible to God, and to regard all men as brothers, made the 
existence of private, exclusive and passionate attachments to individual 
human beings seem inherently questionable.” (p. 2.) 
7 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1171a3. 
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Why, though, has ethics shifted its focus in this way? Though the reasons 
are obviously many and complex, I think two grounds – or rather clusters of 
grounds – are worth highlighting. Both provide serious reasons for thinking 
that the shift towards impersonal moral obligation is justified, and will 
therefore need to be addressed by any revisionist account which would seek 
to re-instate the “good life” concerns such as friendship that were central for 
Aristotle. The first set of reasons are normative, or moral/political, and are 
connected with modernity’s emphasis on the values of (negative) freedom 
and equality. It is a fundamental tenet of liberalism that individuals should 
be free to determine and pursue their own ends to the extent that this does 
not interfere with the ability of other individuals to do likewise; and this jars 
with the Aristotelian belief that philosophers can determine “the best life” for 
man. For if there is an objectively “best life” this undermines the view that 
society is best off leaving everyone to freely determine their own ends – it 
might be better for society to “encourage” its members to follow the best life, 
rather than allowing them to make their own choices and therefore, perhaps, 
choose sub-optimal paths. Conversely a focus on obligation fits the liberal 
political framework nicely, since it concentrates attention on what we owe to 
others irrespective of the goods that each of us pursue: ethics becomes 
focussed on setting the boundaries of the permissible in our interaction with 
others. As well as the value of freedom, however, modern ethics also clearly 
incorporates the value of equality, since the major systems (Kantianism, 
utilitarianism) assume that whatever the nature and grounds of our moral 
obligations they are not partial with regard to their object: what we owe 
depends purely on the situation and on the action in question, not on who is 
involved. Otherwise, we would be violating the ethical principle of 
impartiality. It is thus a basic assumption of modern ethical theory that an 
ethical system should be describable in universalist terms, without reference 
to any particular facts about those who are involved in it.  
However, if these moral-political grounds were the only ones then the 
complete abandonment of the Aristotelian agenda in ethics would be 
surprising, since although liberty and equality are both extremely popular 
causes they are by no means universally acclaimed, and those who do not 
espouse them might have been expected to retain a commitment to the old 
“good life” framework. That they by and large do not is, I think, largely due 
to the other major ground for the shift to the modern ethical framework, 
namely a widespread scepticism about the epistemological/metaphysical 
foundations of the Aristotelian system. For Aristotle is committed to the view 
that the human being has an essence which can be expressed in teleological 
terms: not only do we have a “true nature”, but that true nature is something 
we must seek to achieve, since it is the intrinsically good in man. The whole 
point of ethics within the Aristotelian framework is thus to help us to attain 
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this hidden “true nature” and thereby reach our full potential as human 
beings. Modernity, though, is sceptical about every step of this argument. It 
is suspicious of any “essence of man”, but especially one that is conceived, as 
Aristotle conceives it, as also the goal of man and the embodiment of the 
good: we are simply no longer this optimistic about who we are. Moreover, 
even if this teleological “true nature” did exist, many moderns would be 
sceptical about the ability of philosophers to detect it. It has often been wryly 
noted that Aristotle’s supposedly abstract “end of man” actually looks 
remarkably like the ideal of the Athenian gentleman/citizen which prevailed 
at the time, and there would be a great deal of suspicion that any modern 
attempt to reconstruct an ideal would be similarly time-bound – that it 
would be the product more of its author’s unconscious prejudices than of his 
insights into the true nature of man. Faced with these enormous sceptical 
obstacles, it is no wonder that ethics has scaled back its ambitions in the 
modern period and restricted itself to systems of right behaviour which do 
not require the same leaps of metaphysical and epistemological faith. 
 Such, then, are the challenges facing those who would shift ethics 
back to a framework that can incorporate discussion of substantive questions 
of “the good life” such as the nature and value of friendship. In the next two 
sections I consider the efforts of first MacIntyre and then Nietzsche to do just 
that, and try to assess how each in turn fares. 
2. MACINTYRE’S NEO-ARISTOTELIAN FRAMEWORK. 
2.1 MACINTYRE’S CASE FOR AN ARISTOTELIAN REVIVAL. 
MacIntyre’s After Virtue seeks to overturn the dominant (liberal) model 
of ethics in favour of a revived Aristotelianism: here I outline very briefly his 
negative case against the liberal model, his positive case for neo-Aristotelianism, 
and his ideas on how friendship would fit within the revised framework. 
MacIntyre’s basic case against the framework of “liberal modernity” is 
that ethics simply makes no sense outside a teleological framework. He 
asserts that modernity only has fragments of the former system left, which it 
cannot make sense of in isolation from the broader framework they once 
belonged to:  
 
Since the whole point of ethics… is to enable man to pass from his present state to 
his true end, the elimination of any notion of essential human nature and with it 
the abandonment of any notion of a telos leaves behind a moral scheme composed 
of two remaining elements whose relationship becomes quite unclear. There is on 
the one hand a certain content for morality: a set of injunctions deprived of their 
teleological context. There is on the other hand a certain view of untutored-human-
nature-as-it-is. Since the moral injunctions were originally at home in a scheme in 
which their purpose was to correct, improve and educate that human nature, they 
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are clearly not going to be such that they could be deduced from true statements 
about human nature or justified in some other way by appealing to its 
characteristics.8  
 
In MacIntyre’s view a “catastrophe”9 has befallen ethics, analogous to the 
collapse of the Roman Empire, except that we are not even aware that the 
catastrophe has taken place but (wrongly) think we still have all the pieces of 
a working system in place, and are then puzzled by their failure to cohere. He 
thus interprets the failure of modern foundationalist projects in ethics as 
inevitable: they were doomed from the start because they failed to 
incorporate teleology. MacIntyre also has certain normative criticisms of the 
liberal ethical framework. The loss of teleology means a loss of guidance, and 
the modern (ethical) subject is thus anomic – lost and confused: ‘Moral judge-
ments lose any clear status…(they) become available as forms of expression 
for an emotivist self which, lacking the guidance of the context in which they 
were originally at home, has lost its…way in the world.’10  
As MacIntyre sees it, the only way to recover from the failings of the 
current ethical framework is to return to something like the old Aristotelian 
approach, since without teleology ethics has become incoherent and modern 
man anomic. The trouble is that, as we have seen, modernity had good 
reasons for rejecting the old metaphysical foundations of Aristotelian ethics 
in a supposed ideal essence of man, and is unlikely to change its mind about 
this. MacIntyre himself accepts the judgement of modernity on this question, 
and recognises the need for a different way of grounding the telos: ‘although 
this [MacIntyre’s] account of the virtues is teleological, it does not require 
the identification of any teleology in nature, and hence it does not require 
any allegiance to Aristotle’s metaphysical biology.’11 Instead, MacIntyre develops 
a more socially grounded conception which emphasises the embededness of 
individuals in communities and assumes that the good of the individual 
cannot be detached from the good of the community. The good cannot be 
generated as an abstract ideal but must be derived from the practices of 
communities; “the good life for man” at its most general would denominate 
the goods that all communities hold dear. 
As regards the question of friendship’s place within ethics, MacIntyre 
hints at a peculiarly important role, perhaps even more critical than within 
Aristotle’s own schema, for a shared vision of the good within a community 
can only come about if that community is in fact constructed on the basis of 
the bond of friendship. As MacIntyre puts it: 
  
                                         
8 MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 52. 
9 MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 1. 
10 MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 57. 
11 MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 183. 
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the application of [a] measure [of human goodness] in a community whose shared 
aim is the realisation of the human good presupposes…a wide range of agreement 
in that community on goods and virtues, and it is this agreement which makes 
possible the kind of bond between citizens which, on Aristotle’s view, constitutes a 
polis. That bond is the bond of friendship….which embodies a shared recognition of 
and pursuit of a good.12  
 
Given that MacIntyre does not have access to Aristotle’s metaphysical 
account of the ends of man, friendship appears indispensible for his account 
of the construction of the good life for man based on his membership of a 
community; for without the bond of friendship and its shared view of the 
good there is no community. Friendship may then be more than just one 
virtue among many; it could actually be foundational for the very project of 
constructing a moral community.  
2.2 ASSESSMENT OF MACINTYRE’S CASE. 
How persuasive is MacIntyre’s critique of liberal modernity and his 
argument for an Aristotelian alternative? These are, I think, two logically 
separable questions which can be taken in turn. 
In my view his most effective criticism of the modern ethical framework 
has to do with the problem of anomie. Liberal ethical theory shies away from 
the question “how should I live?” not just because it assumes that no general 
answer can be given but also because it holds that individuals are independent 
and autonomous, capable of giving an authoritative answer to the question 
on their own and neither requiring nor welcoming external “assistance” in 
order to do so. MacIntyre is effective at arguing for the social embededness of 
human beings, one important consequence of which is that people look for 
guidance from their community and society about the roles they should play 
in life and are liable to feel “lost” when the only message society gives them is “it’s 
up to you”. He thus appears to identify a normative need (for guidance about 
“what should I do?” questions) which is not fulfilled, indeed is completely 
ignored, by the discourse about normativity (ethics) in its modern guise.  
Other elements of his story are less persuasive, however. In particular, the 
“catastrophe” metaphor, which is important rhetorically for suggesting the 
intrinsic superiority of the classical framework (playing on our sense of 
Roman civilisation as superior to that of the Dark Ages), seems completely 
misleading. It implies that there was some equivalent of the Goths and 
Vandals standing between modern and ancient ethics, an external disruptive 
force, whereas much of MacIntyre’s own account makes it clear that the 
transition was largely an organic development, a quite inevitable response to 
                                         
12 MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 146. 
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a loss of faith in key elements of the metaphysical worldview underpinning 
the Aristotelian ethical theory. Similarly, it is unconvincing to portray morality 
today as ‘a set of injunctions deprived of their teleological context’, as the 
content of ethics has also quite clearly changed – the starting point for this 
discussion was the fact that friendship is no longer considered an ethical ques-
tion at all, which is a development entirely in keeping with the disappearance 
of teleology and the “privatisation” of concerns about the good life. As we 
have seen, the concerns of modern ethical theory are those minimal codes of 
behaviour which it may be possible for us to agree on without reaching 
consensus about “the ends of man” – it is no accident that justice is nowadays 
the pre-eminent ethical quality. Thus it could be said against MacIntyre that 
we do not have “fragments” of the old ethical system but a significantly 
different set of concerns. 
MacIntyre’s revived Aristotelianism is no more convincing. His decision 
to abandon the search for metaphysical foundations of the telos avoids one 
set of criticisms but his alternative of grounding it in a community and tradition 
creates other serious difficulties. Perhaps the most basic is that while 
MacIntyre still wishes to speak of the good life for man, it is hard to see how 
any socially-based version can avoid being plural due to the great divergences 
between societies in their forms of life and core values. This gives MacIntyre’s 
efforts to characterise the good life an elusiveness which is quite alien to 
Aristotle; tellingly, he can only define it as a process, not give it concrete form: 
‘the good life for man is the life spent in seeking for the good life for man’.13 
This absence of content raises doubts about the extent to which MacIntyre 
can deal with the problems of anomie he identified in the liberal ethical frame-
work. It also leaves MacIntyre vulnerable to the classic liberal critique of 
community-based ethical systems, namely that they are only as good as the 
quality of the community that forms them, and are as likely to instantiate a 
society’s irrational prejudices as they are its wisdom. MacIntyre is clearly 
aware of this danger, insisting that he intends the particularity of one’s commu-
nity to form only a starting point, and that ‘it is in moving forward from such 
particularity that the search for the good, for the universal, consists.’14 But 
having abandoned the “metaphysical biology” which allowed Aristotle to 
move from the particular to the universal, it is completely unclear what could 
now guide such a movement – or indeed that anything like “the universal” 
can still exist given the limitations of MacIntyre’s conceptual resources. 
There is also a problem regarding the practicality of MacIntyre’s alter-
native. He makes much of the intimate connection between politics and 
ethics in Aristotle which has been lost with modernity’s refusal to consider 
                                         
13 MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 204. 
14 MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 205. 
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concrete notions of the good, but it is one thing to evoke nostalgia for the 
holistic nature of Greek ethical life and quite another to explain how some-
thing equivalent is possible under the very different conditions of modernity. 
As we have seen, MacIntyre emphasises the link between friendship and 
community, insisting that the latter should be based on the bond of 
friendship which ‘embodies a shared recognition of and pursuit of the good’, 
but this is surely only possible at any time within a small community, 
nothing like the scale of the modern nation-state; and the barriers must be 
even greater in liberal societies where there is by now a “tradition” of dis-
agreement over ends, and an absence of “a shared recognition of and pursuit 
of the good”. Since MacIntyre himself admits that ‘our society as a whole has 
[no] shared moral first principles’,15 his proposals take on a somewhat 
utopian air, a suspicion not weakened by his invocation at the close of his 
work of St. Benedict.16 It is hard to avoid the impression that the only form 
of social and ethical life MacIntyre finds acceptable is unavailable to 
modernity as whole, and can at best be created in small communities by 
groups of “friends” who prefer to withdraw from the modern world. 
To summarise, then, MacIntyre has some acute observations about the 
failure of modern ethics to deal with questions of the good life and the 
dangers of anomie that are likely to attend this failure, but he does not make 
a persuasive case that his neo-Aristotelian ethical framework is a viable 
alternative – and consequently the case for friendship’s re-incorporation into 
ethics remains unproven. As this means we are at something of an impasse 
there is a clear value in searching for a “third way”, and I have chosen to 
pursue this possibility by considering Nietzsche’s approach to ethics. This is, 
I think, a logical place to look, as MacIntyre himself identifies Nietzsche as a 
key figure, significantly different both from the “liberal modernity” compart-
ment into which he happily places figures as disparate as Mill, Kant and 
Hume; and also from the neo-Aristotelian model MacIntyre himself 
proposes. Nietzsche is also one of the few modern theorists (apart from 
MacIntyre) to discuss the significance of friendship. MacIntyre, naturally, 
believes that Nietzsche’s challenge is one he can ultimately meet, but I will 
suggest, to the contrary, that Nietzsche’s approach to ethics is not only 
considerably more interesting than MacIntyre allows, but also may offer the 
best way of escaping the bind we would otherwise be faced with as a result of 
the inability of either the liberal or neo-Aristotelian framework to overcome 
the other side’s key objections. 
                                         
15 MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 236. 
16MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 245. 
 267 
3. NIETZSCHE AND CONTESTIVE ETHICS. 
3.1 NIETZSCHE’S POSITION. 
MacIntyre builds Nietzsche up as the most trenchant modern critic of the 
liberal ethical framework, only to conclude that Nietzsche is in the end only 
the non plus ultra of the very tradition he attacks.17 He exposes the failings 
of the liberal tradition effectively but according to MacIntyre has as an 
alternative only a vision of “the great man” who is unconcerned with 
morality and seeks simply to impose his will on the world. This is equivalent 
in MacIntyre’s view to ‘moral solipsism’, for ‘to cut oneself off from shared 
activity in which one has initially to learn obediently as an apprentice learns, 
to isolate oneself from the communities which find their point and purpose 
in such activities, will be to debar oneself from finding any good outside 
oneself.’18 Not surprisingly, MacIntyre finds this vision deeply unattractive, 
and if it were true that Nietzsche’s positive contribution amounted to so little 
then it could indeed be quickly dismissed. However, Nietzsche’s positive 
philosophy is notoriously difficult to decipher and in my view MacIntyre’s 
ultra-brief characterisation borders on caricature. There is much more to 
Nietzsche than the amoral, solipsistic “great man”, and in what follows I will 
offer a different and, I hope, more interesting account, which can be a 
serious rival to both liberal modernity and neo-Aristotelianism. It is, I think, 
a position that can be called an “ethics”, albeit one which challenges many of 
the current presuppositions about what ethics is. It also has a place for 
friendship, which would hardly be possible if MacIntyre’s characterisation of 
Nietzsche as a moral solipsist were correct. 
To have a chance of giving Nietzsche a fair hearing it is necessary to 
understand that he breaks with a very basic assumption of ethical theorising, 
and indeed of philosophy in the Western (Platonic) tradition more generally 
– namely that the task of the philosopher is to discover basic universal 
truths about the object of his study. If we return to the question of why ethics 
shifted away from the Aristotelian framework, we will recall that a critical 
reason for the transformation of ethical discourse was that modernity no 
longer believes in the possibility of articulating universally valid truths about 
the good. Consequently it has shifted instead to the attempt to establish 
universally valid truths about basic rules of right conduct. This is clearly a 
retrenchment, since it is more likely that consensus can be reached on the 
                                         
17 “…the Nietzschean stance turns out not to be a mode of escape from or an 
alternative to the conceptual scheme of liberal individualist modernity, but 
rather one more representive moment in its internal unfolding.” MacIntyre, 
After Virtue, p. 241.  
18 MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 240. 
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minimum acceptable patterns of behaviour within a society than on what 
substantive good the members of that society should be trying to achieve. 
Modern liberal ethics is thus ethics faute de mieux, more limited in scope 
because it is now generally agreed that we have more limited insights into 
the universal than the Greeks assumed possible. As we have seen, MacIntyre 
does not dare to challenge this assumption (he goes along with the rejection 
of Aristotle’s “metaphysical biology”), and is thus put in the uncomfortable 
position of gesturing towards the good life for man without any longer 
possessing the metaphysical framework that can show us how we will get 
there. But the key point is that both sides assume that the task of ethical 
theory is to achieve universal consensus about the ethical, whether that is 
conceived as right conduct or the good life. 
Now an alternative response to the perceived impossibility of determining 
the good life could be, not to avoid the topic of the good life (as modernity 
does), nor to retain it as something like the grail, the object of a quest that 
will never be attained (as MacIntyre does), but to carry on discussion of the 
good life while openly acknowledging the impossibility of accessing a 
univocal truth on this matter, on the assumption that it is too important for 
ethics to drop (and we should therefore rather sacrifice our commitment to 
universality). Nietzsche, in my view, wants to do precisely this, and his 
approach is expressed poetically by Zarathustra in a statement which I read 
as highly significant for an understanding of Nietzsche’s method:  
 
“This – is now my way: where is yours?” Thus I answered those 
who asked me “the way”. For the way – does not exist!19  
 
It is clear from this comment that Nietzsche rejects the liberal response to 
plurality: the fact that the way (or the good life for man) does not exist is not 
seen as an excuse for abandoning the topic of “the way” in favour of 
something else. But equally he diverges from the neo-Aristotelians and their 
efforts to recuperate the lost unity of “the way” by reference to such entities 
as “community” and “tradition”, which they hope will ultimately enable a 
consensus to be constructed as a matter of social practice even it is not 
grounded in “true human nature”. Nietzsche is clearly uninterested in such a 
consensus: Zarathustra’s articulation of a way is a gauntlet laid down to the 
world; the challenge is not to follow him but to find a suitable alternative. 
I would like to describe this approach with the term “contestive ethics”, 
and it is important to emphasise that this operates in Nietzsche both at the 
primary and at the meta-level. Thus at the primary normative level he 
advocates what he sometimes describes as “Roman virtues”, which include 
                                         
19 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (London: 
Penguin, 1961), “Of the spirit of gravity”.  
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the injunction to “be hard”20 and to be ready for war and conflict.21 But the 
really distinctive feature of his thinking is that he does not seek to show that 
his own preferred virtues are “the true ones” but rather goes out of his way to 
emphasise that they are the virtues appropriate only for particular types of 
people, and encourages contest between these (“his”) virtues and others, 
notably Christian values.22 If there is “the good” for Nietzsche it is in the form of 
a world where contest between rival values and value-systems is expected and 
encouraged; conversely his vision of distopia would be a world in which a 
single value-system has achieved such hegemony that people no longer even 
realise that there could be alternatives – which is in fact very close to what he 
believed Christianity had achieved in nineteenth century Europe. It is 
something approaching a philosophical duty in his view to attack hegemonic 
values – making him the “philosopher of opposition” par excellence. 
Nietzsche’s views on friendship fit seamlessly into this contestive ethics 
framework, as the main distinctive feature of his account is precisely that it 
stresses contest between friends: ‘In your friend you should possess your 
best enemy. Your heart should feel closest to him when you oppose him.’23 
This can be contrasted directly with the view of friendship ascribed by 
MacIntyre to Aristotle as “...that which embodies a shared recognition of and 
pursuit of the good. It is this sharing which is essential and primary to the 
constitution of any form of community...” For “shared recognition of the 
good” Nietzsche substitutes “contest”. The idea seems to be that the friend 
plays a role akin to a Zen master, obstructing and challenging us rather than 
supporting and comforting us. And yet though it contrasts with Aristotle, 
there is still something very Greek about this approach: for the point of the 
friend/opponent is to challenge us to achieve the best we can achieve, to 
attain arete (excellence). At the same time, it possesses a dynamism alien to 
the ancient worldview, which assumed that it is possible to tell the truth of 
the good life and the virtues once and for all. Nietzsche’s ethical framework 
actually requires the existence of a plurality of views of the good life, none of 
                                         
20 E.g. This new law-table do I put over you, O my brothers: Become hard!’ 
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, “Of old and new law-tables”, #29.  
21 In conscious opposition to Christian values he asserts at one point that “War and 
courage have done more great things than charity.” Nietzsche, Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, “Of war and warriors”.  
22 The locus classicus for the value of conflict between Roman and Christian ideals 
is On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 
1967), I, #16, where Nietzsche states: “today there is perhaps no more decisive 
mark of a “higher nature”, a more spiritual nature, than that of being divided 
in this sense and a genuine battleground of these opposing values [Roman and 
Christian].” 
23 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, “Of the friend.” 
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which can claim hegemony, articulated by our friends/opponents as a set of 
challenges to us: “will you live like this?...if not, then how?” It is thus entirely 
appropriate that Nietzsche performs the value of contest in his own texts, 
through his own belligerence and refusal to seek consensus through 
extensive appeal to shared principles in his argumentation. As I see it this is 
not just an interesting rhetorical feature, but an enactment of the theory of 
“contestive ethics”. For a modern to articulate a substantive view of the good 
life as if it were of universal application would in Nietzsche’s view be an act 
of mauvaise foi, and since Nietzsche insists on the importance of broaching 
the good life he must also insist at every step on constructing the view he 
expresses as a provocation, and not (in the usual philosophical manner) as a 
truth for Everyman.  
3.2 ASSESSMENT OF NIETZSCHE’S POSITION. 
Nietzsche’s approach to ethics and, within that, to friendship, is an 
important alternative to neo-Aristotelianism because it is not vulnerable to 
the kind of counter-attack liberal modernity can offer to MacIntyre. 
MacIntyre assumes that ethics needs to recover a shared sense of the good 
and that friends who share common ideals can help recreate communities 
with a sense of common purpose; but liberal theorists, as we have seen, have 
good reasons for supposing that modern societies neither can nor should 
rediscover a unitary sense of the good, and that friendship therefore deserves 
to be kept off the ethical agenda since it cannot help with regard to the 
modern ethical quest for minimal, universally applicable moral obligation. 
Nietzsche, like MacIntyre and Aristotle, sees connections between friendship 
and the search for the good life, but in his case friendship is seen as 
conducive to contest between rival ways or views of the good, rather than as 
supporting the formation of a unitary vision of the good life for man. It is 
thus entirely consistent with the pluralistic nature of modern societies in a 
way that MacIntyre’s vision of an Aristotelian revival is not. 
However, while I think Nietzsche’s “third way” allows ethics to retain 
attractive features of both Aristotelianism and liberal modernity (namely on 
the one hand a focus on the good life and on the other a commitment to 
pluralism), it will still face major objections from both sides. As we have 
seen, MacIntyre accuses Nietzsche of ‘moral solipsism’, and while I think he 
overstates his case,24 Nietzsche certainly places considerably more stress on 
                                         
24 Notably, MacIntyre’s suggestion that Nietzsche does not take seriously “shared 
activity in which one has initially to learn obedience as an apprentice learns” 
is plain wrong: Nietzsche is insistent on the importance of obedience as a 
precondition for achieving mastery. For instance in Beyond Good and Evil, 
trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1966), #188 he goes as far as to 
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the individual and considerably less on the community than does MacIntyre. 
There is, I think, an unbridgeable gap between the two outlooks on this 
point. MacIntyre’s focus on anomie leads him to see the answer in a strong, 
unitary, coherent community which will be capable of providing individuals 
with a large proportion of their identity, and he assumes that in a healthy 
society there will be fundamental and widespread agreement about the good life. 
Nietzsche, by contrast, sees the need to have one’s goal or purpose given to one 
from the outside as a sign of weakness, and understands a healthy society as 
one in which the highest individuals are encouraged to give themselves their 
own purpose and to compete among each other in setting goals and trying to 
achieve them: he therefore assumes that in a healthy society there will be 
fundamental and widespread disagreement about the good life.  
But MacIntyre is wrong in thinking that Nietzsche’s individualism places 
him squarely in the camp of liberal modernity, for Nietzsche praises the 
individual in a way that sets him apart from liberal ethical theory. Whereas 
the latter is concerned with establishing minimal codes of moral obligation 
and the essentially negative task of limiting the interference of other individuals 
and the state in our private lives, Nietzsche is interested not in protecting the 
individual but in encouraging him to become great, which he typically expresses 
in the formula: “not freedom from what, but freedom for what?”25 Liberal 
ethical theory’s focus on treating others fairly is thus a matter of indifference 
to Nietzsche. He is quite ready to sanction interference with others if that 
will lead to their development; indeed, it may well be approaching a duty to 
do so: Zarathustra’s Übermensch teaching after all begins with the words, 
“man is something to be overcome. What have you done to overcome him?”26 
From a liberal standpoint, then, Nietzsche is an individualist only in a very 
qualified sense: he is for the individual who is engaged in a process of (self-) 
overcoming. And his commitment to pluralistic societies is not, as it is for 
liberal modernity, a consequence of a commitment to letting individuals 
choose their own path; rather, pluralistic societies are seen as conducive to 
greater possibilities of “overcoming”, since the contest of rival traditions 
stimulates those who take part in it. Not difference per se, but the contest 
between different ideals and traditions is where Nietzsche locates value. And 
this, needless to say, is also very different from the liberal ethical tradition 
which generally seeks to ringfence differences and places a keep out sign 
marked “tolerance” in front of them.  
                                                                                      
suggest that “What is essential “on heaven and earth” seems to be, to say it 
once more, that there should be obedience over a long period of time and in a 
single direction: given that, something always develops, and has developed, 
for whose sake it is worth while to live on earth...”  
25 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, “Of the way of the creator”. 
26 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Prologue, #3. 
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To summarise, then, Nietzsche does clearly present a “third way” which, 
while it has certain overlaps with both neo-Aristotelian and modern liberal 
approaches to ethics, is nevertheless radically distinct from both of them and 
not in my view assimilable to either of the other two. To the extent that he 
combines an Aristotelian stress on the goal of life with liberal theory’s stress 
on the primacy of the individual, he might be considered a hybrid between 
the two; but the martial side of Nietzsche’s thinking, his stress on opposition 
and contest, marks a radical break with both the other approaches, and 
indeed with Western approaches to ethics in general. Hitherto, it has always 
been assumed in our tradition that disagreement on ethical questions is a 
problem requiring a solution: the great divide has concerned whether 
agreement should be sought at the level of substantive questions of the good, 
or rather at the level of a framework of right conduct which would render any 
disagreement on substantive questions harmless. Nietzsche turns things on 
their head, seeing disagreement as healthy and consensus as suspect: he 
would create, rather than resolve antagonisms. Since in his view the true 
friend is also the true antagonist, we can conclude that his unconventional 
notion of friendship is an integral part of his unconventional view of ethics.  
CONCLUSION: HOW FRIENDSHIP CAN RETURN TO ETHICS  
If I am right, it is no accident that Nietzsche and MacIntyre are among the 
very few modern philosophers who even mention friendship. For modernity 
has generally assumed that it is impossible to articulate a universally valid 
view of the good life for man and that the topics of ethics have to be redrawn 
accordingly, to concentrate instead on basic moral obligations, about which 
we might still hope to discover general truths. Friendship, as a form of 
human interaction which is non-universal, selective, and particular by its 
very nature cannot hope to fit in this scheme; hence its exclusion. And the 
great challenge for those who would like friendship and other more 
substantive elements of “the good life” to be returned to the ethical table is to 
show how this will still be possible after the discrediting of “true human 
nature”, the concept around which the original Aristotelian discussion of the 
good life was constructed. 
So is friendship, then, a proper topic for ethics? In the sense that people 
have never stopped asking themselves “how should I live?” there is and 
always has been a “market” for an ethics of the good life which would include 
topics such as friendship, but the great inhibitor in modernity has been the 
pervasive sense that “the” good life is an illusion, and consequently that 
philosophers no longer have a right to enquire about it. MacIntyre has tried 
to find a way back to the good life without recourse to Aristotelian 
 273 
metaphysics, but in my view he is better at the negative task of showing the 
deficiencies of the liberal ethical tradition, and hence the need for a return to 
good life concerns, than at the positive task of resuscitating Aristotelianism. 
As he himself admits, his approach sets him on a collision course with the 
modern world, and a retreat to some sort of vaguely monastic life would 
seem to be the only way that the sort of Aristotelian community he hopes for 
can in fact come about under present conditions. Nietzsche’s approach, on 
the other hand, avoids this sort of head-on confrontation with modern pluralis-
tic societies. He accepts unreservedly modernity’s judgement that “the” good 
life does not exist, but in contrast to the liberal ethical tradition he still 
insists on the need for philosophy to discuss it anyway. He can do so because 
he is not signed up to the usual philosophical assumption that the task of 
ethical theory is to seek universal consensus – indeed, he insists on the 
importance of contestation and disagreement, promoting and exemplifying 
what I’ve called “contestive ethics”. This approach would allow a return of 
friendship to ethics and is consistent with key assumptions and characteristics 
of modernity, but we followers in the footsteps of Plato should be under no 
illusions about how radical a break with tradition is involved in taking up 
Nietzsche’s gauntlet – nothing less than abandonment of “the truth”. If we 
are ready to accept this challenge, then we are ready for a return of friend-
ship to ethics.  
